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The House of Lords is the world’s longest-established and probably best-known 
second chamber. Wholly unelected, with most members appointed for life, it appears a 
vestige of the ‘elite’ form of bicameralism once common throughout Europe. Hence calls 
for major reform are commonplace. However successful changes have been piecemeal and 
rare. Meanwhile the UK is not federal, but is nonetheless a ‘union state’, comprising the 
territories of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each with its own distinct 
governing arrangements. These were most recently boosted by the 1997 Labour 
government’s devolution programme. Hence for decades, and particularly the last 20 years, 
devolution and Lords reform have both been on the UK’s political agenda. Throughout 
this time attempts to create a ‘second chamber of the nations and regions’ have repeatedly 
failed. This paper reviews the proposals made, and the obstacles they faced – drawing 














The UK might at first glance appear an unlikely candidate for inclusion in a discussion 
on federalism and bicameralism, having never been a federal state. Its second chamber, the 
House of Lords, is one of the best-known in the world, but as an unelected body 
incorporates no form of territorial representation.I 
Nonetheless, both the territorial nature of the UK state and the appropriate form of 
UK bicameralism have long been under discussion, and focus on both matters has 
intensified over the past 20 years. The Labour government elected in 1997 arrived in office 
with an ambitious agenda of constitutional reform. This included two clear areas of 
‘unfinished business’ from past periods of government by the left: devolution and House 
of Lords reform. For a brief period, at least, these topics were seen as connected – and 
some in the UK still believe that they should be, through creation of some form of ‘second 
chamber of the nations and regions’. While the House of Lords could be seen as a vestige 
of the old ‘elite’ model of bicameralism, this kind of reform would bring the UK into line 
with many other bicameral countries around the world (Coakley 2014, Patterson and 
Mughan 1999, Russell 2000, Tsebelis and Money 1997). However no progress towards a 
more territorial second chamber has ever yet been achieved. 
This paper reviews proposals for a UK territorial second chamber in context, asking 
why calls to adopt such a model have been so unsuccessful. It begins by briefly reviewing 
the territorial history of the UK, and the history of debates on Lords reform. It then turns 
to the various proposals that have been made for forms of territorial representation in the 
UK second chamber, particularly since the 1990s. In doing so it recognises that territorial 
representation may potentially be reflected in both the composition and the functions of a 
second chamber (Russell 2001). While UK debates have given some limited attention to 
the former, they have barely touched upon the latter. The paper ends with a summary of 
the obstacles to creating a UK territorial second chamber. Some of these are relatively 
unique to the UK case, but others are familiar from other countries’ long-running debates 
on territorial politics and second chamber reform. 
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2. The UK as a territorial state 
 
The United Kingdom brings together four historically distinct territorial areas (or 
‘nations’): England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. These combined through a 
series of historic unions: between England and Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707, and 
Ireland in 1801 (Bogdanor 1999a). While England and Wales essentially merged their 
governance and legal structures, a degree of distinctiveness continued to exist in the other 
areas. Significant tensions over the Irish union in the 19th century led to prolonged debates 
about ‘home rule’ (for Ireland, but also potentially the other areas), and ultimately Irish 
independence in 1921. This left the six counties of Northern Ireland under UK rule, with 
their own devolved parliament at Stormont, which was later suspended in 1972 during the 
so-called ‘troubles’ between the Catholic/nationalist community and Protestant/Unionist 
community. This sectarian divide continues to define the politics of Northern Ireland, and 
is reflected in its party system – which differs entirely from that of the mainland UK. In 
addition Scotland and Wales both have nationalist parties – the Scottish Nationalist Party 
(SNP, formed in 1934), and Plaid Cymru (formed in 1925). 
Hence despite being formally unitary, the UK is arguably best described as a ‘union’ 
state, with distinct territorial dynamics (Mitchell 2009). Its territorial history has continued 
to deeply influence UK politics, most obviously in terms of pressures for devolution, and 
consequent changes. 
Following the ‘home rule’ debates, devolution next appeared most firmly on the 
political agenda in the 1970s. A Royal Commission on the Constitution (commonly 
referred to as the ‘Kilbrandon Commission’) was established by Harold Wilson’s Labour 
government in 1969. The Commission’s principal focus was territorial politics, and 
although its members were not united the majority report suggested new elected assemblies 
for Scotland and Wales (Royal Commission on the Constitution 1973).This proposal was 
supported by the Labour government elected in October 1974, which legislated to establish 
such assemblies, subject to referendums in Scotland and Wales – neither of which 
approved the plans. Soon after, a Conservative government was elected which rejected 
devolution. 
The Conservatives were in government for 18 years, but fast progress followed the re-
election of Labour in 1997. Legislation was passed to facilitate referendums on 
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establishment of a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, both of which approved the 
proposals that year. The next year a referendum in Northern Ireland on the ‘Good Friday 
Agreement’ agreed the re-establishment of a Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont. Also 
in 1998, Londoners voted for creation of a Greater London Assembly and Mayor. Beyond 
this, Labour proposed elected assemblies in the English regions, but these plans were 
abandoned, following heavy rejection at the first referendum (in North East England) in 
2004. Nonetheless, Regional Development Agencies and Government Offices of the 
Regions were created in eight areas, covering the whole of England (outside London), 
overseen by indirectly elected bodies including local councillors. These boundaries, 
collectively representing the ‘nations and regions’, were used for election of UK MEPs 
from 1999. However, English regional structures were largely dismantled following the 
election of a Conservative-led coalition government in 2010 (Sandford 2013). 
Territorial devolved arrangements in the UK have always been characterised by 
asymmetry, and their introduction been driven by political pragmatism rather than grand 
design. They exist, of course, in the absence of a codified constitution – where such rules 
might otherwise be set out and entrenched. Prior to 1997 Scotland and Northern Ireland 
retained separate rules and structures, and each, alongside Wales, had its own dedicated 
Secretary of State responsible for policy at Cabinet level. Parallel parliamentary structures 
existed in the House of Commons, including ‘select committees’ for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, to oversee the three territorial government departments, and ‘grand 
committees’ made up of MPs representing each area. The 1997-98 settlement then 
devolved distinct powers to each nation, broadly similar to those previously resting with 
the Secretary of State. Powers were most extensive in Scotland, including full legislative 
competency in areas such as education, health, environment and local government, and 
weakest in Wales – which initially had very limited legislative power. In all three areas 
devolved policy competencies have subsequently grown, boosted in Scotland in particular 
by pledges from the UK party leaders when campaigning in the failed independence 
referendum, held in 2014 following calls by the Scottish SNP government. 
The biggest current controversy concerning devolved powers results from ‘Brexit’ – the 
UK’s process of withdrawal from the European Union. This has caused significant 
arguments about the level of government to which powers currently held by the EU (e.g. 
over fisheries and agriculture) should be repatriated. Arrangements for intergovernmental 
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relations within the UK are generally seen to be weak (Swenden and McEwen 2014), and 
have recently been described by the Welsh Government (2017) as ‘inadequate’. These 
arrangements were built in the early years of devolution, when Labour was in power at UK 
level and in Scotland and Wales, allowing relatively informal intraparty communications. 
Another unresolved issue for UK devolution is the ‘English question’ (Hazell 2006). 
Devolved government within England remains patchy, with a Greater London Assembly 
and Mayor, alongside other ‘metro mayors’ in seven other areas. But these bodies have 
varied and relatively weak powers, and cover only part of the English population (Sandford 
2016). Since the 1990s some campaigners have rejected the regional approach altogether, 
and called instead for establishment of an English Parliament (Russell and Sheldon 2018). 
As things stand, Westminster already serves in many important policy areas largely as a 
parliament for England. There has hence been significant controversy concerning the 
voting rights of MPs from the devolved areas – the so-called ‘West Lothian question’ 
(Bogdanor 2010). In 2015 this was partly resolved by introduction of a system of ‘English 
votes for English laws’ (Gover and Kenny 2016). 
 
3. The long and winding road of  Lords reform 
 
The long-running nature of constitutional debates about the UK’s territorial 
arrangements has been more than rivalled by the concurrent debates about second 
chamber reform. The House of Lords has ancient roots, traceable through at least 1000 
years of history to the bodies of noblemen drawn together to advise past monarchs 
(Russell 2013). The development of bicameralism was gradual, but clearly established by 
the 14th century. The Lords fits historically with the model of an ‘elite’ chamber, similar to 
those which once existed in other European states such as France, Italy, Sweden, Hungary 
and Spain (Marriott 1910). It influenced establishment of other such bodies, such as the 
Japanese House of Peers and the Canadian Senate.  
While most of these other chambers have since been swept away, the Lords has 
remained – albeit being reformed incrementally, through measures that have collectively 
added up to a significant transformation. Reform pressures can be traced back centuries, 
but gained strength in the late 19th century, as the franchise for the House of Commons 
widened. The first substantial change came through the 1911 Parliament Act, which 
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removed the House of Lords’ absolute veto over legislation, reducing this to a power of 
delay in most cases.II The same Act also defined a category of ‘money bills’ over which the 
chamber’s power was even more constrained. The 1949 Parliament Act reduced the power 
of delay broadly from two years to one, which is where it remains. Hence the House of 
Commons can in theory pass a bill without the Lords’ consent; but in practice this has 
occurred only very rarely, and the two chambers tend instead to reach agreement through 
negotiation. 
Changes to the composition of the House of Lords have occurred more slowly. Prior 
to 1958 the chamber comprised largely of hereditary peers (who passed their titles down 
the – almost invariably male – family line), alongside 26 Church of England bishops.III In 
1958 a Conservative government passed the Life Peerages Act, which allowed new 
members to be created for life, rather than requiring a new hereditary peerage to be 
bestowed. From this point on, the usual way into the House of Lords was through 
appointment as a life peer – appointments being made by the monarch, acting on the 
Prime Minister’s advice. 
The Life Peerages Act did not remove the existing hereditary peers, and pressures for 
reform continued. In 1968 Harold Wilson’s government introduced a bill for wholesale 
reform of the Lords, to further reduce its powers and alter its balance of membership. 
However this was withdrawn following resistance by the House of Commons. 
Subsequently no further government proposals were advanced for three decades. 
The 1997 Labour government arrived in office on a manifesto pledge to remove the 
remaining hereditary peers as ‘an initial, self-contained reform’, which would be ‘the first 
stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and 
representative’ (Labour Party 1997). This ‘first stage’ was largely achieved through the 
House of Lords Act 1999, which expelled over 650 such members – roughly halving the 
size of the chamber. However, following a compromise with the Conservatives, 92 
hereditary peers were allowed to remain. Reform nonetheless transformed the membership 
of the chamber, and particularly its party political balance – since many departing 
hereditary peers were Conservatives, and very few were Labour. Today the House of Lords 
includes roughly equal numbers of Conservative and Labour peers, with the balance of 
power held by the Liberal Democrats and a large group of independent ‘Crossbenchers’. 
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Labour remained in office for 13 years, but the promised ‘second stage’ of Lords 
reform never occurred. Under Labour there were various initiatives (described in more 
detail in the next section), including a Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of 
Lords (the ‘Wakeham Commission’), which reported in 2000, and four subsequent 
government White Papers containing various proposals.IV Beyond the government, further 
initiatives came from parliamentary committees and other cross-party groups. With one 
minor exception, no proposal resulted in legislation being introduced. 
After Labour left office, a further White Paper and a draft House of Lords Reform Bill 
were published by the 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat government, but ultimately 
failed. Ambitious in its scope, this initiative was spearheaded by the Liberal Democrat 
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. A government Bill was introduced into the House of 
Commons in 2012, but was withdrawn when it became clear that it lacked adequate 
Conservative support. Subsequently, debate on the options for Lords reform has 
continued, but the only reforms achieved have been small. The House of Lords Reform 
Act 2014 resulted from a private member’s bill (promoted by former Liberal Party leader 
Lord Steel of Aikwood), and simply created a right for life peers to permanently retire from 
the House of Lords.V Most recently one of the biggest concerns has been the chamber’s 
growing size, due to large numbers of prime ministerial appointments (the number of 
which remains unregulated). In March 2018 membership of the chamber was just under 
800. Consequently proposals for a reduction in size were recently made by a committee 
convened by the Lord Speaker (Lord Speaker's Committee on the Size of the House 2017). 
 
4. Options for territorial bicameralism 
 
Given the importance of territorial relations to the UK’s constitutional history, it would 
be natural for a settlement between the nations and regions to have been reflected in 
reform to the second chamber. Despite also not being strictly federal, such arrangements 
have for example been captured in 20th-century reform of bicameralism in Italy (Lodici 
1999) and Spain (Juberias 1999).  
The modes in which a second chamber can be ‘territorial’ reflect the broad functions of 
legislatures: representation, decision-making, linkage and legitimation (Loewenberg 2011, 
Russell 2001). Hence territorial politics may be reflected in either the composition or 
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functions of a second chamber. The extent to which this succeeds in creating a chamber 
that provides a voice for territorial units, and successfully binds the nation together, 
depends on certain key features of institutional design.  
Compositionally, strongly territorial designs often give territorial units equal 
representation irrespective of population size (as in the US and Australia, for example), or 
give disproportionate weight to smaller units (as in Austria, Switzerland and Germany), 
short of equality. Strongly territorial designs also often involve representation through 
‘indirect’ election, by members of sub-national legislatures (as in Austria, India and South 
Africa), or even through appointment by sub-national governments (as in Germany). 
Alternatively, territorial representatives may simply be elected by the people directly, using 
the boundaries of subnational units (as in the US and Australia), or be appointed centrally 
to represent such units (as in Canada). 
In terms of policy-making, some territorial second chambers have enhanced powers 
over legislation affecting the subnational units (e.g. Germany, South Africa). Potential also 
exists for such bodies to stage territorially-focused debates, organise territorially-focused 
committees, or give special consideration to bills proposed by subnational units. Procedural 
arrangements promoting meaningful territorial representation also include provision for 
block voting by representatives of such units (again for example Germany, South Africa), 
and for formal accountability mechanisms back to the assemblies of those areas (Russell 
2001). 
The extent to which second chambers actually serve a territorial function may hence 
depend on their composition, powers and procedures. In many states where the second 
chamber serves notionally as a territorial forum binding the nation together, such as 
Australia, Canada and Spain, its ability to do so meaningfully is disputed – with 
implications for legitimation. In Canada the Senate’s reputation as a territorial chamber is 
damaged by the fact that appointments are made by the federal prime minister with no 
provincial input. In Australia, critics complain that senators, despite being elected as state 
representatives, vote rigidly along party lines. However, territorial influence can be subtle: 
in the latter case the fact that senators are elected by proportional representation ensures 
that geographically diverse voices are heard in behind-the-scenes meetings in the party 
room. 
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5. A brief  history of  territorial proposal for House of  Lords reform 
 
The above discussion helps to provide a framework against which to judge past 
proposals for a UK territorial second chamber. This section analyses such schemes across 
four time periods: before the Labour government’s election in 1997, surrounding the Royal 
Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords 1998-2001, during the decade 2002-
2012, and since. The extent to which these included features associated with strong 
territorial second chambers is summarised in Table 1. We see that while there have been 
numerous proposals in the UK for a reformed second chamber compositionally 
representing the nations and regions, these have largely been at the weak end of the 
spectrum. Discussion of territorial powers and functions has meanwhile been extremely 
underdeveloped. Throughout these debates there has been some limited learning from 
models in other bicameral states. 
 
5.1. Pre-1997 proposals 
An exhaustive historical account of proposals for a UK territorial second chamber 
would be challenging, given the plethora of schemes mooted over centuries for Lords 
reform. But two particularly high profile packages of proposals are worth mentioning in 
the pre-1997 period. 
In 1917, following the passage of the 1911 Parliament Act, a cross-party Commission 
was established chaired by the Liberal constitutionalist Viscount Bryce, to consider the next 
steps in House of Lords reform. Its report provided a definitive analysis of the role of the 
second chamber, and made recommendations for compositional reform (Bryce 1918). The 
Commission’s most favoured solution was for 75% of members of the second chamber to 
be elected by members of the House of Commons, organised in regional blocs (while the 
remainder would be drawn from existing peers). However, this electoral arrangement 
appeared merely to be driven by convenience, rather than any expectation of regional 
representation. The report included no suggestion that the Lords or its members should 
perform any explicit territorial function. 
The Kilbrandon Commission of the 1970s, in contrast, was primarily focused on 
resolving the UK’s territorial tensions, not on Lords reform. Its majority report, while 
recommending elected assemblies for Scotland and Wales, made no proposal for links to 
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the second chamber. Indeed it explicitly rejected such an idea, suggesting that ‘if a regional 
structure for Parliament were thought advantageous… it would be inadvisable to link it 
with the House of Lords’; as representation in the House of Commons was already based 
on geographical areas, the report suggested that it would be ‘irrational to introduce a novel 
geographical factor into the House of Lords’ (Royal Commission on the Constitution 1973: 
322). Nonetheless, a ‘memorandum of dissent’ was issued by two members of the 
Commission, which included some strongly differing ideas. This argued for elected regional 
assemblies in England, in addition to the new bodies in Scotland and Wales, and suggested 
that 150 new members should be added to the Lords, drawn from the members of these 
bodies. As well as proposing indirect election, a broad principle of equality was envisaged, 
with some limited weighting: each of five English regions would have 20 representatives, 
alongside 25 each for Scotland and Wales (which would significantly advantage those two 
areas in population terms). In support of their case the authors drew attention to the 
German example. Among the arguments made for such representation was the idea that 
members of the new elected bodies should be given ‘a national and public platform on 
which to make their voices heard’ which could help ‘to provide a countervailing force’ to 
the ‘centripetal pull’ of central government (Crowther-Hunt and Peacock 1973: 118).  
In retrospect, 45 years on, these remain the most radical territorial proposals yet to 
have been made by any official body on Lords reform. For critics of the Kilbrandon 
Commission’s work, the majority report demonstrated ‘tunnel vision’, by ‘straining so hard 
(yet unsuccessfully) to focus on a single devolutionary proposal that they dared not look 
around to see the constitutional problems they were passing by’; yet in proposing an all-UK 
arrangement for devolution the authors of the minority report suffered from an ‘obsession 
…with comprehensiveness and uniformity’ (Daintith 1974: 555). Neither set of proposals 
resulted in immediate change, but it was the majority report that went on to have more 
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5.2. Proposals 1998-2001: the Royal Commission and immediate responses 
The question of territorial representation in the second chamber did not subsequently 
reach the mainstream until the 1997 Labour government simultaneously sought to pursue 
devolution and House of Lords reform. In an initial White Paper published alongside the 
announcement of the new Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, the 
government set out future priorities and options for the promised ‘second stage’ of reform. 
This specified that the Royal Commission’s terms of reference would require it to ‘take 
particular account of the present nature of the constitutional settlement, including the 
newly devolved institutions’ (Cabinet Office 1999: 10). The White Paper noted that 
territorial arrangements were common in second chambers overseas, and commented (ibid: 
36) that: 
 
By the time a fully reformed second chamber can be put in place, there will be devolved institutions in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. London will have its directly elected Authority. English 
regionalism will be increasingly recognised through Regional Development Agencies and regional 
chambers. Some regions may be working towards regional assemblies of their own. The relationship of 
the second chamber to those bodies will need to be a signiﬁcant part of the Royal Commission’s 
deliberations; it could have a marked impact on both the second chamber’s functions and how its 
members are selected. 
 
One option mentioned was that of indirect election by the devolved bodies, where the 
White Paper simply noted that ‘If the Commission were attracted to this basic principle it 
would no doubt wish to take evidence, including from the devolved institutions 
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themselves, as to how this… might operate’ (ibid: 48). The purpose of the paper, however, 
was primarily to illustrate a wide range of ideas, and pass consideration of them over to the 
Royal Commission, rather than making specific recommendations. 
The Royal Commission itself dedicated a full chapter of its final report to ‘Giving a 
voice to the nations and regions’. This opened by suggesting that ‘Deciding what 
relationship the reformed second chamber should have with the devolved institutions has 
been one of the most interesting and important aspects of our work’ (Royal Commission 
on the Reform of the House of Lords 2000: 58). Nonetheless, the Commission’s proposals 
in this area were modest, when compared with the Kilbrandon Commission minority 
report. An explicitly stated reason was that devolution was at very early stages. The 
Commission was established in 1998, and published its report in spring 2000, while the 
new legislatures in Scotland and Wales were elected for the first time in May 1999, and the 
new Northern Ireland Assembly just 11 months earlier. New structures in the English 
regions were promised, but this process had barely begun. Hence the Commission noted 
that (ibid: 108): 
 
indirect election would really only be relevant in respect of those regions which already have devolved 
institutions, i.e. Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and perhaps London. It could therefore only make a 
partial contribution to the composition of the second chamber and would be unfair to most of England.  
 
This caused the Commission to conclude that, while representatives of the nations and 
regions were desirable, they should be directly elected by the citizens of those areas.  
The Commission noted that representation of subnational units in federal second 
chambers is organised ‘frequently on an equal or at least graduated basis, while the lower 
chamber is constituted on a population basis’, commenting that the UK ‘however, is not a 
federal state’ (ibid: 59). It went on to suggest that ‘the great disparity between the sizes of 
the different nations and regions of the United Kingdom means that an equal distribution 
of seats would be inappropriate’ (ibid: 105) – population figures are illustrated from an 
analysis at the time in Table 2. A consideration here, though not explicitly stated by the 
Commission, was almost certainly that Northern Ireland would be greatly 
‘overrepresented’. This could bring particular problems given that area’s distinct politics 
and political party system. 




Table 2: Distribution of a possible 240 seats in a territorial second chamber, based 








South West 4,841 20 20 
Eastern 5,293 22 20 
South East 7,895 32 20 
West Midlands 5,317 22 20 
East Midlands 4,141 17 20 
Yorkshire and Humberside 5,035 20 20 
North East 2,600 11 20 
North West 6,891 28 20 
London 7,074 29 20 
Wales 2,921 12 20 
Scotland 5,128 21 20 
Northern Ireland 1,663 6 20 
TOTAL 58,801 240 240 
Source: Russell (2000: 311). 
 
The Commission ultimately proposed that elected members should be distributed 
between nations and regions proportionately to population, and chosen via a proportional 
electoral system (on the same boundaries as those used for the election of UK MEPs). But 
concerns about the impact on the chamber’s democratic legitimacy and relationship with 
the House of Commons led the Commission to propose that these members should 
comprise only a minority of the chamber (12 – 35%).VI Most other second chamber 
members would continue to be appointed at a UK level, albeit via an updated process. As 
well as dismissing indirect election, the Commission opposed members of the second 
chamber holding a ‘dual mandate’ as members of a devolved legislature. 
These decisions on composition already limited the possibilities for territorial functions 
to be performed by the reformed second chamber. The Commission noted that ‘Many 
respondents to our consultation paper agreed that regional representation as a feature of 
the reformed second chamber could act as a kind of “constitutional glue”‘ (Royal 
Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords 2000: 58). It suggested that these 
members might ‘contribute to cohesion’, ‘help resolve concerns about the protection of 
Scottish interests in the second chamber’, and ‘build on the emerging political identity of 
the nations and regions of the United Kingdom’ (ibid: 60). However, beyond simply being 
elected from these areas, it had little to say about linkages to the devolved institutions; 
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instead it merely proposed that ‘It is for the members of the various Parliaments and 
Assemblies to decide what links they should establish’ (ibid: 63). It made clear that the 
second chamber ‘should not become a forum for inter-governmental liaison’ (ibid: 62) and 
its role ‘should not be to provide a vehicle by which the devolved institutions themselves 
could be represented in Parliament’ (ibid: 63). The Commisssion’s only firm suggestion for 
territorial functions was that the new chamber should consider establishing a Devolution 
Committee, which would consider relations between the devolved institutions and the 
centre, and relations between the institutions themselves. Notably, while other proposals 
from the Royal Commission for establishment of new committees – including one 
focussed on human rights, and another broadly on the constitution – have subsequently 
been adopted by the House of Lords, this proposal has not.  
In retrospect the Royal Commission’s proposals look timid, and could be seen as a 
missed opportunity to propose a strongly territorial second chamber at a key moment for 
the newly-devolved UK. But the timing, rather than being propitious, proved 
disadvantageous. The two processes were developing simultaneously, but independently, 
and Commissioners were cautious about dictating plans from the centre that might not 
reach approval in the devolved areas. Meanwhile, they were offered little guidance by 
representatives of those areas. The Commission invited evidence, and received 1,734 
submissions. But none were forthcoming from the new bodies in Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales. Some interest was expressed in indirect election by political parties from 
these areas – the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (1999: 3) suggested that there was a 
‘Strong case for some members to be indirectly elected by members of the devolved 
national Assemblies and Parliament and the future bodies for the regions of England’, 
while Plaid Cymru (1999: 2) suggested that choice of elected members ‘may be by a 
mixture of direct and indirect election (by the national and regional Assemblies and 
Parliaments for example)’. But the SNP preferred abolition of the second chamber, arguing 
that for it to be ‘a forum where regional and national voices may be heard’ would be ‘far 
from simple’ (Scottish National Party 1999: 6); meanwhile the (nationwide) Liberal 
Democrats (1999: 28) suggested that it would not be ‘appropriate to use an electoral college 
drawn from the nations and regions’ and that ‘There is no satisfactory substitute for 
allowing the people of the United Kingdom to elect directly their representatives’.VII 
Greater interest in territorial options was seen in the submissions by some representatives 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
284 
of English regional forums. Indirect election were suggested by the North West Regional 
Chambers and the Eastern Region Local Government Conference, while various such 
groups expressed aspirations that the second chamber would enhance cohesiveness, and 
act as a space for negotiation between different areas. But these bodies themselves, and 
their ideas, were both underdeveloped.  
Some detailed and thoughtful submissions were received by the Royal Commission 
from academics. Professor Vernon Bogdanor, author of key texts on devolution (e.g. 
Bogdanor 1997, Bogdanor 1999a, 2009), noted that some hoped a territorial chamber 
‘could perhaps play its part in holding the United Kingdom together in the face of the 
centrifugal pressures threatening to tear it apart’ (Bogdanor 1999b: 3). But he suggested 
that direct election to such a chamber would lead to party dominance, while indirect 
election would face major practical difficulties given the lack of elected bodies in England. 
Bogdanor also pointed out that the nature of the devolution settlement – which gave the 
new bodies largely separate policy responsibilities to those of UK central government – 
made it inappropriate for their members to have a role in scrutinising UK-level legislation. 
Another well-known expert, Professor Iain McLean (1999: 3), noted that either a directly 
or indirectly elected model was theoretically possible, but that ‘the problem of England 
haunts both models’. He also reflected on the distribution of seats, noting that ‘the 
principle of territory gives equal votes to each territory regardless of population’ (ibid: 4), 
but equality by nation would be unacceptable to England (which accounts for 85% of 
population), while equality by region might also provoke controversy. 
It is hence understandable that the Royal Commission was cautious. Nonetheless, some 
specialists expressed disappointment post-publication in the lack of imaginative thinking 
on territorial options in its report. Russell and Hazell (2000: 7) noted that ‘The 
Commission’s proposals in this area mostly relate to the composition of the chamber, 
rather than its powers and functions… [which] sits uncomfortably with their general 
approach whereby composition flows from functions, rather than vice versa’. Likewise 
Russell and Cornes (2001: 91) suggested that ‘the Commission … did little to identify what 
territorial role or functions the upper house might play in a devolved UK’. Procedural 
options to encourage meaningful representation might for example have included 
formalised territorial representation on second chamber committees, or encouraging 
members representing the nations and regions to make regular reports to their respective 
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assemblies – perhaps through question times or committees, at least starting with the 
existing devolved areas. Nonetheless, these were fairly niche concerns. The main criticism 
expressed (both in the media and parliament) of the Royal Commission’s proposals related 
to the low proportion of seats proposed for elected members. 
Subsequent to the Royal Commission’s report, the government issued a new White 
Paper, in which it accepted some elements of the Commission’s analysis, but made 
modified proposals. However these were even less ambitious than the original, both in 
terms of territorial representation and elected members. With respect to indirect election, 
the White Paper (Lord Chancellor's Department 2001: 19) noted that:  
 
The French and German second chambers are composed on this basis, as a means of fortifying the voice 
and influence of sub-national government - the Länder Governments in the German case - in the 
national Parliament. Devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland together with the creation of the 
Greater London Assembly, and the Government’s intention to publish a White Paper taking forward its 
Manifesto commitment for directly elected regional government in England, gives some force to the 
argument for such an approach in the UK. However, the great majority of England is not at present 
covered by assemblies above the level of local government and the Royal Commission reported that they 
had found little desire for direct representation in House of Lords to be drawn from the UK’s devolved 
institutions. The Royal Commission concluded that a directly elected minority component of the Lords, 
chosen on a regional basis, would be a better way of guaranteeing effective representation of the nations 
and regions, beyond that provided through the nominated membership. The Government agrees. 
 
Regarding roles, the White Paper baldly stated that ‘There is no case for giving specific 
new functions to the House of Lords’ (ibid: 11). There was no discussion of any special 
weighting for regional seats, and the government simply proposed, as had the Royal 
Commission, that seats should be allocated proportionately by population. Elections 
should use regional boundaries and there should be 120 elected members in a chamber of 
600 (20%), with the remainder centrally appointed. 
The government’s proposals, like those of the Royal Commission, were not received 
well among parliamentarians and the public. The main point of contention was the low 
proportion of elected members, with little focus on the weakness of the territorial 
proposals. Had the devolved bodies expressed concerns, these might have been taken 
seriously. But the new bodies were busily focused on developing their own procedures and 
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policy responsibilities, and there was no other clear political dynamic through which 
territorial claims might gain momentum. Among the UK-wide parties the Liberal 
Democrats were the most strongly committed to devolution, but favoured direct election. 
The Conservatives were ambivalent about both devolution and Lords reform, while the 
Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had little personal interest in constitutional affairs, and 
was concerned about any measure that would give added legitimacy and strength to the 
Lords (for discussion see Cook 2003). In Wales, Plaid Cymru was ambivalent about the 
Lords itself, while in Scotland the SNP had a long-held commitment to unicameralism. In 
its own evidence to the Royal Commission the latter admitted that as a separatist party 
there was ‘no secret that the Scottish National Party does not want to strengthen the 
Union’, meaning it had no interest in building institutions that would help to bind the UK 
together (Scottish National Party 1999: 6). The Labour manifesto for the general election 
of 2001 said nothing about links between Lords reform and devolution, stating only that 
‘We have given our support to the report and conclusions of the Wakeham Commission, 
and will seek to implement them in the most effective way possible’ (Labour Party 2001). 
The Liberal Democrats (2001) stated that they would ‘replace the House of Lords with a 
smaller directly elected Senate with representatives from the nations and regions of the 
UK’Liberal Democrats (2001). Neither the SNP nor Plaid Cymru made any reference in 
their manifestos to Lords reform. 
 
5.3. Proposals 2002-2012: the battle over direct election 
In the next period proposals for House of Lords reform continued to pay some lip 
service to questions of territoriality, but were largely focused on resolving the increasingly 
intractable dispute between those who favoured elected versus appointed members.VIII 
In 2002, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee launched an 
inquiry into next steps for Lords reform. As the government’s White Paper proposals had 
been widely rejected – including by Labour backbenchers – it sought explicitly to find a 
‘centre of gravity’ around which opponents could unite. This intervention had fairly explicit 
support from the Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook, who – depsite being a 
member of the government – was troubled by its proposals (Cook 2003). A central feature 
of the committee’s work was a questionnaire circulated to all MPs, which suggested that a 
majority of members of the House of Commons supported a second chamber that was 
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wholly or largely elected. The headline recommendation of its report was that the elected 
proportion in a reformed second chamber should be increased to 60%. 
The Public Administration Select Committee went further than most bodies in 
expressing interest in indirect election, partly prompted by Cook. In his oral evidence to 
the committee (Public Administration Select Committee 2002: 26) the Leader of the 
House, who represented a Scottish seat, suggested: 
 
As someone who comes from a part of the UK where there is a vigorous and well supported devolved 
body I can see the attractions of the indirect election route. It also ... comes closer to the model that 
exists through most of Europe. Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands all have second chambers 
which are predominantly reflections of indirect election by regional and local bodies.  
  
But the committee commented that ‘we need to hear from the devolved institutions 
that they want to be represented in this way. No evidence has been received from the 
devolved bodies’ (ibid). Like others before it, it concluded that indirect election would be 
‘difficult to pursue further, because it is not a feasible proposition until there are elected 
assemblies in England which could form electoral colleges alongside the devolved 
assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’, but commented that this was 
‘something to revisit in the future, when the devolution settlement is more complete’ (ibid). 
The committee gave no attention to territorial functions, being largely preoccupied with the 
argument over the second chamber’s composition, and did not consider any other option 
beyond population-based distribution of seats. Like the Royal Commission and the 
government, it proposed that elected members be chosen by proportional representation, 
using the boundaries of the nations and regions. 
Following this committee report, the Leader of the House successfully negotiated 
establishment of a joint committee of both chambers to consider the issue of Lords 
reform, and to devise a range of options to be put to both in unwhipped votes. The 
committee issued a report in which it noted that ‘a reformed House should contain an 
appropriate number of members from all parts of the country’, but with reference to 
indirect election commented that ‘it is difficult to see at the moment structures which are 
parallel to those to be found in fully federal countries like the USA and Germany upon 
which to base this representation’ (Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform 2002: 11). 
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Hence, like previous bodies, it simply suggested direct election using regional boundaries. It 
gave no consideration to territorial functions, but did note joint evidence received from the 
Presiding Officers of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland 
Assembly, who were all at that time members of the House of Lords, which suggested that 
such office holders should in future automatically hold seats on an ex officio basis – to 
provide at least some link to the devolved bodies. Even this minimal proposal has not been 
acted upon, and no Scottish or Welsh Presiding Officer has since been appointed to the 
House of Lords.IX 
The centre of the joint committee’s report was a set of options for composition 
combining appointed and directly elected members, where the elected members might 
comprise 0%, 20%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 80% or 100%. In the votes that followed, the House 
of Commons rejected all seven options (and also rejected the option of unicameralism) 
while the House of Lords voted in support of an all-appointed chamber (McLean, Spirling 
and Russell 2003). 
The pattern of failure was now becoming established, and the government clearly had 
no discernable instruction from parliament to act. However a further White Paper was 
issued after the votes, suggesting that – rather than introduce elections – the appointments 
process for the House of Lords should be put onto a more rational basis. By this point the 
debate over meaningful territorial representation or functions was largely closed, though 
the paper did note with respect to appointments that ‘We wish to see a mix of independent 
members that are representative of the nations and regions of the UK’ (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs 2003: 53, 44). As the House of Commons had only recently rejected 
the notion of a wholly appointed second chamber, the proposals in this paper got no 
further. 
Two years later there was an attempt by a senior cross-party group of parliamentarians 
– including Robin Cook, who had since left the government, and Tony Wright, the chair of 
the Public Administration Select Committee – to revive the Lords reform debate. Their 
jointly-produced report, which included a draft bill, proposed a 70% elected second 
chamber. This group expressed some interest in the possibility of indirect election of 
representatives for the nations and regions, but noted that ‘it [had] not been proposed by 
any major group so far considering Lords reform’, and that ‘there [had] been little interest 
amongst the devolved assemblies themselves, or from local government, in this form of 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
289 
representation’. In addition, ‘particularly following the recent failure of the referendum in 
the North East … [there was] no obvious basis for electing English members’ (Tyler et al. 
2005: 26-27).The paper hence proposed, like its predecessors, direct election using regional 
boundaries, with the distribution of seats based on population.  
This demonstrates how, even among senior political actors interested in principle in 
creating a territorial second chamber, opportunities to achieve this seemed limited and the 
primary concern was with increasing the proposed proportion of elected members. This 
was the argument that dominated public debate, with proponents of a high elected 
proportion demanding a more electorally legitimate second chamber, and opponents 
fearing the effects on the chamber’s relative power in relation to the House of Commons. 
Very little energy was focussed on strengthening the possible role of the second chamber 
regarding devolution, and there was no political campaign for such a change, in the absence 
of interest from the (by now increasingly established) devolved bodies. 
Over the subsequent years, proposals regarding devolution and House of Lords reform 
continued in parallel, but rarely overlapped. The government became increasingly open to 
the arguments in favour of a majority-elected second chamber. A third post-Wakeham 
White Paper proposed a 50% elected chamber, and noted that indirect election of some 
kind (not necessarily territorial, but perhaps instead for example based on vocational 
groups) could avoid conflicts over legitimacy, but that there would be ‘inevitable arguments 
about who would comprise the electoral colleges’, and that the Royal Commission had 
dismissed this option (Cabinet Office 2007: 33). The paper made no recommendations 
whatsoever about powers and functions – only composition. It was followed by a further 
set of free votes in the House of Commons, in which a majority of MPs this time 
supported either an 80% or 100% elected chamber. A government White Paper in 
response set out broad principles for an 80% directly elected variant, making no mention 
of other territorial options. This paper noted that ‘Proposals for indirect electoral systems 
for the second chamber have been put forward on a number of occasions but have never 
gathered a great deal of support’ (Ministry of Justice 2008: 23).  
The Labour government, which remained fundamentally divided on the question of 
elections to the Lords, did not attempt to legislate for this solution. Its only legislative 
proposals for Lords reform were some far more incremental proposals in the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2009-10, which would have removed the 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
290 
remaining hereditary peers and allowed life peers to retire. However, even these minor 
measures were dropped when the bill ran out of time before the 2010 general election. 
Labour lost this election, which resulted in the Conservatives again being the largest 
party – but short of a House of Commons majority. The Conservatives hence formed a 
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The latter party, as already indicated 
above, had long sought radical Lords reform. However, its primary interest was in an 
elected second chamber, rather than one necessarily performing any kind of meaningful 
territorial role. 
The minister responsible for Lords reform was the Liberal Democrat Leader, and 
Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg. A year after the general election he produced a draft 
government bill for consultation, alongside a White Paper. This followed very naturally 
from the recently preceding proposals by, first, supporting a chamber that was 80-100% 
directly elected using regional boundaries and, second, giving virtually no attention to the 
functions of the chamber, only to its composition. In terms of functions the paper 
suggested in summary that ‘The reformed House of Lords would have the same functions 
as the current House’ (Cabinet Office 2011: 7). Even the use of regional boundaries was 
discussed only in the context of the electoral system, and justified by stating that ‘The 
Government considers it practical where possible to start from the basis of existing 
boundaries in use for elections in the UK’ (ibid: 16). Far from any suggestion that there 
should be non-population weighting, the document included a section entitled ‘Equally 
weighted votes’, which emphasised that there must be ‘broad equality in the potential 
weight of a vote across the country’ (ibid). This was a sensitive topic, as the Conservatives 
were keen to legislate to equalise the electorates of House of Commons constituencies, in 
the belief that the present system favoured Labour. Ultimately, the Conservatives and 
Labour jointly wrecked Nick Clegg’s plans for Lords reform, and in retribution his party 
blocked the Conservatives’ proposed boundary changes for the House of Commons. 
The first step in parliamentary consideration of the Clegg proposals was establishment 
of a Joint Committee to review the draft bill. The proposals were highly divisive, and a 
wide range of opinions were represented on this committee – creating significant incentives 
to propose alternative schemes. But the Joint Committee report included no discussion of 
links to devolution. Among the evidence received was a submission from the Welsh 
Assembly, which did not argue for indirect election or any kind of territorial functions for 
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the second chamber – merely pressing for Wales to have a fair number of seats. Neither 
the Scottish Parliament nor the Northern Ireland Assembly submitted evidence. 
Nonetheless the committee did comment that, if the present proposals failed (as they 
shortly would), it ‘would like the Government to give further consideration to a nationally 
indirectly elected House as an alternative’ (Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords 
Reform Bill 2012: 33). Its definition of indirect election was broad, including both 
territorial and vocational alternatives. Again, indirect election was mooted not in order to 
perform any specific territorial linkage function, but to avoid the competing legitimacy that 
the House of Commons might face if the second chamber were directly elected. 
 
5.4. Post-2012 Proposals: a limited return to territorial models 
Following the failure of the Clegg reforms there has been some revival of interest in 
territorial solutions. This may be partly due to the full range of options involving direct 
election having been closely considered and rejected. However it is more obviously linked 
to the mounting tensions over devolution, as the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly 
have gained greater powers, and separatist voices have been more clearly heard. In 
particular several proposals emerged around the time of the Scottish independence 
referendum. These were driven by Unionist concerns, that at a time when the UK risked 
falling apart, a territorial second chamber might help to bind it together. 
In late 2013, in the immediate run-up to the referendum, David (Lord) Steel – the 
former Liberal Leader (1976-88) and former Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament 
(1999- 2003), made a speech proposing a more joined-up approach to constitutional 
decision-making, through the establishment of ‘a UK constitutional convention’ (Steel 
2013). He claimed that this could ‘bring some cohesion and principle to the developing 
governance of the United Kingdom. For the truth is that all of our recent institutions 
including the Scottish and European Parliaments have just grown up higgledy-piggledy’. 
This kind of convention might ‘organize a more genuinely federal-type style of government 
throughout the United Kingdom’. Central to such arrangements would be a reformed 
second chamber, where he harked back to the Bryce Commission proposals of 1918 – 
noting that a regional electoral college for selection of second chamber members could 
now extend beyond simply MPs, to include MEPs and members of the devolved 
legislatures. Lord Steel’s preferred model was for the second chamber to have 460 
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members, with slight overrepresentation for the three devolved areas (so that Scotland, for 
example, would hold 40 seats), of which 100 would be reserved for non-party 
representatives. This speech, however, made little impact and led to no subsequent action. 
The next year Gordon Brown, the former Labour Prime Minister (2007-10), published 
a book reflecting on the place of his native Scotland in the UK . This made quite vague 
proposals for ‘a senate of the regions and nations, elected by the people, responsible for 
bringing regions and nations together, and finding a way of ensuring that where one 
measure offends one part of the country this is taken into account in making final 
decisions’ (Brown 2014: 328-29). Brown had campaigned passionately for Scotland to 
remain part of the UK, and clearly hoped that such a second chamber would serve the 
Unionist cause. The proposals were not far developed, but were closely echoed by those 
from his successor as Labour Leader, Ed Miliband (who had previously worked as a 
researcher for Brown). In November 2014, immediately after the referendum, Miliband 
made a speech calling for the second chamber to be ‘truly a senate of the regions and 
nations of our whole country’. According to one account (Labour List 2014): 
 
The Labour leader wants the new chamber to be based on representation of the regions and the four 
nations of the United Kingdom to ensure that there’s great diversity in terms of where members of the 
upper chamber come from. This will take place on a regional basis, to avoid conflicting with the primacy 
of the Commons, and will see the Senate taking on a specific, defined and separate role from the 
Commons. 
 
However, this role was nowhere spelt out, and the only firm pledge was to put the idea 
to a constitutional convention. The commitment to ‘replacing the House of Lords with an 
elected Senate of the Nations and Regions’ then went on to appear in Labour’s manifesto 
for the 2015 general election, alongside a promise to ‘set up a people-led Constitutional 
Convention’ focused on the remaining tensions over devolution (Labour Party 2015: 84). 
However Labour lost this election, after which Miliband immediately resigned as party 
leader. His successor, Jeremy Corbyn, has as yet shown little interest in Lords reform. 
One further intervention has since been made by another senior political figure – 
David (Lord) Owen, a former Labour cabinet minister who was leader (1983-87) of the 
short-lived breakaway party the SDP. He went further than all of the previous proposals, to 
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suggest a ‘UK Federal Council’ modelled on the German Bundesrat (Owen 2016). This 
would have given strongly weighted representation (of between 3-6 seats) to the existing 
devolved areas, plus the eight ‘city regions’ in England possessing newly elected mayors. 
However this body was not intended to replace the House of Lords, but exist alongside it. 
The proposals were relatively underdeveloped and have received little political attention. 
Meanwhile proposals for the Lords itself have moved on from any kind of ‘grand plan’ to 
more modest measures intended to constrain the chamber’s size (Lord Speaker's 
Committee on the Size of the House 2017). 
 
6. Key obstacles to creating a UK territorial second chamber 
 
The preceding section shows that House of Lords reform has been much discussed in 
the UK over the last century, and particularly the past 20 years. Numerous proposals have 
been made to reform the second chamber – while at the same time devolution has been 
established, and gradually developed, across the nations of the UK. At times connections 
have been made between these two sets of developments, with frequent calls for 
representation for the nations and regions in the second chamber. But such proposals have 
repeatedly stalled, and the idea of a strongly territorial second chamber has never captured 
the public imagination. The obvious question, reflecting on this history, is why such 
repeated failures have occurred. Several factors emerge from the account above. 
 
An obvious one, affecting calls for Lords reform of any kind, is the worldwide 
phenomenon that achieving second chamber reform is almost always very difficult (Russell 
and Sandford 2002). This flows in part from the ‘essentially contested’ (Mughan and 
Patterson 1999: 338) nature of second chambers, which exist to challenge first chambers, 
and at the same time must have a different logic of representation in order to be effective. 
Both of these aspects cause controversy. Specific obstacles to reform include the various 
vested interests who may wish to maintain the status quo, conflicts between those who 
seek to strengthen the second chamber and those who prefer to weaken it, low public 
salience, plus general constitutional rigidity. Although the UK has an unwritten and 
famously ‘flexible’ constitution, others of these factors have contributed to Lords reforms 
being only occasional and incremental, rather than decisive and large-scale (Ballinger 2012). 
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Meanwhile, since the 1999 reform, the existing House of Lords is seen as a relatively 
effective body (Russell 2013). 
A second factor more specific to the UK flows from its constitutional flexibility. Unlike 
many other states, the UK has never had a constitutional ‘moment’ – for example after 
war, dictatorship or revolution – which has forced it to construct a new constitution from 
scratch. Instead constitutional developments have been piecemeal and ad hoc. 
Consequently debates on territorial politics and bicameralism have proceeded in parallel 
rather than being resolved in a single package. Other countries that have constructed 
coherent packages of territorial reform have done so in very different circumstances. This 
ad hoc UK pattern also applies to devolution itself – the new institutions in Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and London were legislated for separately rather than in a unified 
statute, with each institution having different powers. Meanwhile, most of England has no 
similar body. Such patchy and piecemeal arrangements make a typically ‘federal’ second 
chamber difficult to envisage. Notably, one of the most ambitious proposals came from 
the Kilbrandon Commission minority report in 1973, whose authors sought unsuccessfully 
to pursue an all-round system of devolution. 
In addition, other aspects of the devolution settlement make typical federal-type 
arrangements difficult. UK devolution, initially in Scotland and Northern Ireland and now 
increasingly also in Wales, has been based on a clean separation of policy responsibilities 
between the UK and the devolved level. There is no clear category of ‘shared’ or 
‘concurrent’ competencies such as exists in most decentralised states. Consequently there is 
no strong rationale for representatives of the devolved bodies to sit at Westminster and 
little shared policy to discuss. This can help to account for the consistently underdeveloped 
nature of proposals for territorial functions in a UK second chamber, as opposed to 
territorial representation. 
This links to a fourth point: that little interest has ever been shown by the devolved 
bodies themselves in developing links via the UK second chamber. Partly a product of the 
lack of shared powers, this also reflects key features of the UK party system. In the early 
years of devolution Labour controlled the UK government, and the administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and London, allowing negotiations to operate through intra-party 
mechanisms. Subsequently the primary challenge to Labour (particularly in Scotland) has 
come from nationalist/separatist parties, which have no desire strengthen the bonds at the 
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UK centre. Unionist parties, meanwhile, do not wish to construct a stronger national 
platform for such voices. Similar tensions are seen in Spain and Canada, where separatist 
parties resist dealing with the shortcomings of the second chamber as a truly territorial 
body (Russell 2001).  
Finally, Russell and Sandford (2002) note that second chamber reform can fail due to 
becoming entangled in other constitutional and political arguments – most obviously, over 
the nature of federalism or decentralisation. In the UK this entanglement has barely existed 
or been an obstacle. Instead the dynamic has almost operated in reverse – debates about 
territorial representation in the second chamber have been eclipsed by fundamental 
disagreements over the role of elections to such a body, and questions of democratic 
legitimacy. This polarised debate – between proponents and opponents of direct election – 
has squeezed out discussion of other models (such as indirect election or ex officio 




The British case hence holds some lessons for the design of territorial second chambers 
in general, but also has its own unique features. The piecemeal nature of devolution in the 
UK, and in particular the lack of uniform devolved institutions in England, alongside the 
extensive powers devolved to other areas, have presented real challenges for the design of a 
meaningful ‘second chamber of the nations and regions’. Even those who have seen the 
merits in principle of such a body have struggled to set out a convincing blueprint.  
Some moments in the debate over the last century might in retrospect be seen as 
missed opportunities. The Bryce report of 100 years ago did not – despite the high 
resonance of ‘home rule’ debates at the time – propose any very convincing form of 
territorial representation, and ultimately anyway failed to result in change. The Kilbrandon 
Commission of the 1970s took a pragmatic and demand-led approach to devolution, 
focusing on Scotland and Wales, which ultimately set the path for the uneven devolution of 
the 1990s. Had its minority report been implemented, an all-round system of devolution 
might have been cemented through a strongly territorial second chamber. However the 
approach of the majority report was less idealistic and ambitious, and far more in line with 
the British way. Another 25 years on, the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House 
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of Lords was less bold than it could have been, but was faced with a difficult environment, 
where devolution was incomplete and there was no bottom-up demand for strong 
territorial representation in the second chamber from the devolved areas themselves. 
A final question is whether implementation of any of these schemes might have helped 
to stabilise UK territorial politics. Although derided for caution at the time, even the Royal 
Commission’s small proportion of directly elected second chamber members might have 
had some impact. Like the elected members of the Australian Senate, they would have 
injected greater territorial diversity into the Westminster party groups – perhaps most 
obviously strengthening the Scottish and Welsh Conservatives. Post-2015, Scottish 
representation in the House of Commons under the ‘first past the post’ system has resulted 
in overwhelming dominance by the SNP. Even a modest sprinkling of second chamber 
members from other parties could perhaps have made Scottish politics feel less detached 
from the rest of UK politics than it currently appears – particularly in the context of 
‘Brexit’. The recent revived interest in territorial solutions seeks to heal these divides, but 
could prove to be too little too late. 
                                                 
 I would like to thank Aman Bharti for background research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
I Members of the House of Lords are appointed on a national basis and have no form of ‘constituency’, 
although their titles do indicate a notional geographical affiliation (e.g. ‘Lord Jones of Birmingham’). The 
exception in terms of members with any more formal territorial link are the bishops, each of whom 
represents a diocese. But even they collectively all represent the Church of England as a whole, and indeed 
see themselves as representing people of faith more generally. 
II The restrictions on the House of Lords’ power over ordinary legislation apply only to bills beginning their 
passage in the House of Commons. Around one third of bills (usually less controversial measures) begin their 
passage in the House of Lords, where the veto continues to exist. 
III There were also a very small number of ‘life peers’ appointed under the Appellate Jurisdictions Act 1876 
for their judicial expertise, in order to contribute to the House of Lords’ function as the UK’s highest court 
(which ended in 2005, when a Supreme Court was established). 
IV For a broader and more general analysis of reform proposals over this period, beyond the territorial aspect, 
see Russell (2013). 
V The Liberal Party was a precursor to the current Liberal Democrats, which in turn resulted from a merger 
between it and the Social Democratic Party in 1988. Lord Steel is also a former Presiding Officer of the 
Scottish Parliament, and appears as a proponent of a territorial second chamber later in the paper. 
VI The Commission put forward three slightly differing models, each comprising a different proportion of 
elected members. Its preferred option was for 87 regional members in a chamber of 550 (15.8%). 
VII The Liberal Democrats, and their predecessor parties, had a long-standing commitment to regional 
representation in a directly elected second chamber. For example the Liberal Party manifesto of 1979 pledged 
that ‘The House of Lords should be replaced by a new, democratically chosen, second chamber which 
includes representatives of the nations and regions of the United Kingdom, and UK members of the 
European Parliament’. The 1987 Liberal-Social Democratic Party Alliance manifesto stated that ‘The Alliance 
will work towards a reform of the second chamber linked with our devolution proposals so that it will include 
members elected from the nations and regions of Britain and will phase out the right of hereditary peers to 
vote in the Lords’ (quoted in Steel 2013). 
VIII For more detailed discussion see Russell (2013). 
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